Insights on Export Controls & Economic Sanctions

On February 26, 2019, Darling Industries, Inc. (Darling) entered into a $400,000, 18-month consent agreement with the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) to settle six alleged violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), issued a final rule that added five recently developed or developing technologies that are essential to the national security of the United States to the Export Administration Regulations’ (EAR) Commerce Control List (CCL).

Between the addition of Huawei, the world’s largest telecommunications equipment maker, to the Entity List and a new EO declaring a national emergency related to information and communications technology and services, last week proved to be nonstop excitement for the export control world.

Yesterday, May 8, 2019, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) authorizing broad new sanctions with respect to the steel, aluminum, iron, and copper sectors of Iran.

After years and years of waiting, it popped out of the hat like a Bunny just in time for Easter. The new 22 CFR 126.4 ITAR license exemption for transfers of defense articles and defense services by or for the US Government (USG) went into effect on April 19, 2019.

Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the President has the authority to impose tariffs on imports to counter trade practices that the US Trade Representative finds either to violate or conflict with a trade agreement or to burden or restrict US commerce unjustifiably.

Three recent settlements between very different employers and the US Department of Justice have highlighted the need for employers to be mindful of the complex interplay between export control laws and anti-discrimination provisions in US immigration laws.

Economic sanctions turbulence continued virtually unabated in 2018 and into early 2019, making work for the sanctions experts both in and out of the US government.

With the escalating political turmoil in Venezuela over the past few weeks, the Trump Administration responded – at least in part – with the imposition of additional sanctions.

In a steady drumbeat of US sanctions targeting Iran during the month of November 2018, the Office of Foreign Assets Control has designated Iran-based financial facilitators of malicious cyber activity and, for the first time, associated digital currency addresses.

Action Alert: BIS Publishes List of Emerging Technologies That It Is Considering Subjecting to Unilateral US Export Controls. Your Company May Need to File Comments by December 19, 2018!

Back in May 2018, President Trump announced the United States’ intention to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and re-impose secondary sanctions on Iran. 

All Bark and No Bite? State Department Explains Further the Waivers of the CBW Sanctions Against the Russian Government, Confirming that Many Exports, Even of National Security Controlled Items, Can Still Be Exported to Russia.

The US Administration announced that it would be imposing sanctions on the Russian Government under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) over the use of a “Novichok” nerve agent in an attempt to assassinate UK citizen Sergei Skripal.

The President issued an Executive Order on August 6, 2018, “Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran” (the New Iran EO), which re-imposes relevant provisions of five Iran sanctions EOs (EOs 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645).

On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States is withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

At the end of January 2018, the Trump Administration took two actions related to the Russia/Ukraine sanctions program under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA), the law that President Trump signed on August 2, 2017.

International Trade Practice Group Leader Kay Georgi and Counsel Regan Alberda discussed economic sanctions under President Donald Trump in an article for The Current: The Journal of the PLI Press.

Right before the holidays, President Trump and his Administration took significant steps toward using economic sanctions to tackle international human rights abuses and corruption.

On January 13, 2017, we announced that the Obama Administration had issued a general license allowing most transactions between US persons and the country of Sudan.

As Yogi Berra once said: “It’s deja vu all over again.” Certainly that’s how it felt on August 24, 2017, when President Trump signed Executive Order 13808 imposing additional sanctions on Venezuela. 

On July 27, 2017, the Senate voted 98-2 to pass a bill, HR 3364, to impose additional sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

On July 27, 2017, the Senate voted 98-2 to pass a bill, HR 3364, to impose additional sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

On July 11, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order extending the review period established by EO 13761 of January 13, 2017, which set forth criteria for the revocation of certain sanctions on Sudan and the Government of Sudan.

On Friday, June 16, 2017, President Donald Trump announced changes to the US-Cuba policy for individual travel to the island nation and engaging in transactions with entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence or security services.