Taking Stock – Summary of BIS Actions From Fall 2024, and Peek at What Is Next Under the Trump Administration

(Of course, the same cannot be said for our colleagues in the tariff world. Check out some of their diligent coverage and analysis of the explosive developments in that area here.)

There are signs that this calm before the storm may soon be coming to an end, with the Trump Administration recently “encouraging” some of BIS’s most senior nonpolitical appointee staff to retire and apparently exploring another round of semiconductor export controls targeting China.

While we still have the chance to breathe, we decided to use this opportunity to summarize BIS actions over the past six months of the Biden Administration. We also peer into the crystal ball, trying to discern what the Trump Administration may do in these areas.

We apologize for our attempt to cram in half a year’s worth of client alerts into a single document but hope this summary may come in handy!

Export Controls

Chip Rules — Lots of Them!

January 2025 Rules 

In its waning days, the Biden Administration shook up the artificial intelligence (AI) industry with two blockbuster interim final rules. First, on January 15, the BIS issued its long-anticipated Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion (AI Diffusion Rule). A day later, the agency issued a second rule, implementing additional controls and due diligence requirements on foundries and Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSATs) companies (Due Diligence Rule).

The AI Diffusion Rule introduced broad controls on AI models and large clusters of advanced computing integrated circuits. BIS’s attempt to balance the goal of limiting the spread of AI technologies to countries of concern against the desire to minimize disruptions to industry and allies resulted in a complex web of regulations. The most notable features of the AI Diffusion Rule include:

• Technology controls on the parameters[1] or model weights[2] of certain advanced AI models, under new Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 4E091, which requires a license for export, re-export, or transfer to all destinations worldwide. Parameters are controlled for AI models trained using 102^6 or more ‘operations.’[3]
• Expanded licensing requirements on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), including worldwide requirements for items that fall under ECCNs 3A090.a, 4A090.a, and the corresponding .z paragraphs (as well as associated technology and software).
• The new Supplement No. 5 to EAR Part 740, which identifies 18 allied countries (including the United States) that are given some relief from the new AI and semiconductor controls through a combination of license exceptions and favorable license review policy.
• A novel license review scheme based on per-country allocations of total processing performance for destinations that are not one of the allied Supplement No. 5 countries nor destinations of concern (i.e., Macau and Country Group D:5).
• New and revised license exceptions are as follows:
  • New License Exceptions Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA), Advanced Computing Manufacturing (ACM), and Low Processing Performance (LPP) for newly controlled items.
  • An expanded License Exception Advanced Computing Authorized (ACA), in order to match the new worldwide controls.
• Separating the existing Data Center Validated End-User Authorization (DC VEU) into Universal and National Validated End-User Authorizations.

The Due Diligence Rule targets chipmaking companies seeking to export advanced ICs to other companies to design, assemble, or test chips. Specifically, ECCN 3A090 now includes a new Note 1, which states that “front-end fabricators” and OSAT “companies are presumed to be exporting 3A090.a ICs designed or marketed for data centers whenever they export “applicable advanced logic integrated circuits” — meaning logic ICs produced using the “16/14 nanometer node” or below or using a non-planar transistor architecture. 3A090.a, which is subject to a worldwide licensing requirement as a result of the AI Diffusion Rule, does not capture ICs with a total process performance below 4800 unless designed or marketed for use in data centers.

The three ways to overcome this presumption — each of which comes with its own reporting and attestation requirements — are:

1. The designer of the “applicable advanced logic integrated circuit” is an approved IC designer or an authorized IC designer.
2. The IC die is packaged by the “front-end fabricator” at a location outside of Macau or Country Group D:5.
3. The IC is packaged by an approved “OSAT” company.

Approved IC designers and approved “OSAT” companies are identified in EAR Part 740’s new Supplements No. 6 and No. 7, respectively. Companies can apply to be placed on these lists by following the requirements in Supplement No. 4 to Part 748. Authorized IC designers are headquartered in Taiwan or Country Groups A:1/A:5, are not located and do not have an ultimate parent headquartered in Macau or Country Group D:5 and have agreed to comply with certain requirement requirements laid out in § 743.9(b). After April 13, 2026, however, this “authorized” status will become temporary; companies will only be considered authorized IC designers if they have applied to become an approved IC designer within the past 180 days.

The AI Diffusion Rule is already in effect, but the compliance date of the new license requirements is not until May 15. The Due Diligence Rule is in full effect currently.

For a deep dive into both rules, check out our separate client alert on the AI Diffusion Rule here, and our full summary of the Foundry Due Diligence interim final rule (IFR) here.

December 5 IFR and Entity List Updates

On December 5, 2024, BIS published an IFR that expanded restrictions targeting China’s AI and indigenous semiconductor production capabilities. The most significant changes include:

• Controls on high bandwidth memory (HBM) chips under new ECCN 3A090.c.
• A whopping eight brand-new ECCNs, as well as revisions to eight existing ECCNs, primarily focusing on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME). 
• Two new foreign direct product rules (FDPRs); one targeting companies on the Entity List with a new Footnote 5 designation, and one focused on SME.
• Clarification that “software keys” and “software license keys” are subject to the same controls as their associated hardware/software.

The newly controlled HBM chips, and the technology and software to develop or produce them, require a license for Macau or Country Group D:5, as well as for any entity that is headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Macau or Country Group D:5. A license is not required for deemed exports or reexports of associated technology or software. There are a couple of ways to get around this license requirement — the new License Exception HBM, and an expansion of the Temporary General License (TGL) that appears within EAR Part 736, Supplement No. 1, General Order No. 4 — to include 3A090.c items. They both come with multi-part and highly contingent eligibility requirements that exporters should review closely before using.

The December 5 IFR also introduces License Exception Restricted Fabrication Facility (RFF), found at a new § 740.26, which can be used to overcome license requirements for eligible ECCNs going to specified entities on the Entity List. RFF can be used only for entity list entities that have the provision § 740.26 referenced in their entity list entry. The intent is to make it possible for facilities that warrant Entity List designation but not currently producing advanced-node ICs to receive legacy equipment. This license exception comes with restrictions on what types of items the eligible commodities can be used to support, and it requires compliance with pre-shipment notification, monitoring, and reporting requirements. So far, Wuhan Xinxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (aka XMC) is the only RFF-eligible entity that BIS has identified.

Needless to say, the December 5 IFR is one of the densest and most extensive BIS rulemakings we have ever encountered, which is really saying something. Our full summary of this absolute monster of an IFR can be found here.

Concurrent with the December 5 IFR, BIS also added 140 entities to the Entity List, all of whom are believed to be helping make advanced-node ICs or semiconductor manufacturing items, and/or have otherwise supported China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy.

VEU Program Expansion

BIS issued a final rule effective on October 2, 2024, including validated end-user (VEU) Authorization for specific data centers (“Data Center VEU” or “Data Center VEU Authorization”) in its VEU program within the EAR. The Data Center VEU Authorization has since been split into two parts — Universal and National VEUs — through the AI Diffusion Rule summarized above.

The purpose of the Data Center VEU is to facilitate the export or reexport (but not transfer!) of items on the Commerce Control List necessary for a data center “to preapproved trusted validated end users in destinations that require a license.” The expanded authorization applies to ECCNs 3A090.a and 4A090.a, and .z items in Categories 3, 4, and 5. Destinations in D:5 countries are excluded from the Data Center VEU program.

The Data Center VEU Authorization aims to develop a “trusted ecosystem” for the use of advanced computing integrated circuits, making it possible for vetted data center operators to receive these circuits without a license. All VEUs, along with the eligible items that may be exported or reexported without a license, are listed in Supplement No. 7 to EAR Part 748.

Parties seeking VEU authorization must submit an advisory opinion request. If the End User Review Committee approves the request, BIS will issue a letter granting VEU status. In addition, parties using Data Center VEU must maintain and allow review of records, and reexporters must file reports to BIS.

More information regarding eligibility, application requirements, approval process, VEU conditions, certification, and reporting requirements can be found here.

IEC Rule

In an effort to sync up US export control policies with allied countries, BIS expanded export controls on items related to quantum computing, chipmaking, and additive manufacturing in an interim final rule released September 6, 2024. The newly controlled items include additive manufacturing equipment (under new ECCNs 2B910, 2D910 and 2E910), coating system technology for gas turbine engines (ECCN 2E903), quantum processors (ECCN 3A901), cryogenic cooling systems (ECCN 3A904), scanning electron microscopes designed for imaging semiconductors and integrated circuits (ECCN 3B903), cryogenic wafer probing equipment (ECCN 3B904), quantum computers (ECCN 4A906); and Gate All-Around chipmaking technology (GAAFET) (3E905). 

At the same time, BIS also carved out several ways to get around the new export controls:

• License Exception implemented export controls (IEC) is available for countries with similar export controls as the United States. The list of eligible destinations can be found here. 
• Exclusions for certain deemed exports and reexports aimed at minimizing disruption to the tech industry. These include a “grandfathering” clause for foreign employees who already have access to newly controlled technology and software; a full deemed export/reexport exclusion for technology and software related to dry etching equipment; and for certain ECCNs, a partial exclusion (not available for deemed exports/reexports to foreign persons whose most recent citizenship or permanent residency is in Country Groups D:1 or D:5).
• Two general licenses, one for GAAFET technology and one for quantum technology.

Read our full summary here.

Biotech Controls

On January 16, BIS announced an interim final rule addressing concerns over the potential threat to US national security and foreign policy posed by accelerated development and deployment of advanced biotechnology tools. Under the IFR, BIS is strengthening controls on two categories of laboratory equipment: 

1. High-parameter flow cytometers used to simultaneously measure several characteristics of individual cells or particles.
2. Liquid chromatography mass spectrometers for top-down proteomics (analytical instruments used to elucidate and quantify unknown biomolecular structures, characterize molecules, and aid in the study of molecular interactions). 

The IFR excludes certain laboratory equipment from its categories. These excluded items are either approved for marketing by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or exempt from the FDA’s premarket notification requirements.

The IFR creates new ECCNs 3A069 and 3E069 to control the above laboratory equipment and related technology for national security (NS), regional stability (RS), and anti-terrorism (AT) reasons. Specifically, the IFR relocates high-parameter flow cytometers and certain mass spectrometry equipment from EECN 3A999 to 3A069 to strengthen the controls on that equipment. It also establishes ECCN 3E069 to control “technology” for the “development” or “production” of these ECCN 3A069 items. 

License applications for items controlled under the new ECCNs will be reviewed under a presumption of denial when destined for a country that is in both Country Groups D:1 and D:5, Macau, or a country in Group E. Exports destined to a country in Country Groups A:1 (i.e., Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States) will not require a license for export. All other applications will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Finally, to provide BIS better visibility into trade flows for the controlled equipment, the IFR amends requirements for Electronic Export Information (EEI) filings in the Automated Export System to require EEI filings for exports of all ECCN 3A069 commodities to a Country Group D destination. 

Please note that, although 3A069 commodities are generally eligible for license exception “Shipments to Country Group B countries (GBS),” License Exception GBS remains unavailable for 3A999 commodities subject to RS controls. 

Space Rule

On October 23, 2024, BIS and the US Department of States’ Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued four new rules to overhaul and modernize US export controls on commercial space-related items. The rules consist of complementary proposed rules by BIS and DDTC (BIS PR and DDTC PR), a BIS final rule (BIS FR), and a BIS interim final rule (BIS IFR). Collectively, they update and clarify the controls on commercial space-related items under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and EAR, although the decontrols, at least from the ITAR, did not go as far as many in the commercial space industry were hoping for. The highlights are as follows: 

• DDTC PR and BIS PR: The DDTC PR, if implemented, would modernize ITAR controls on civil space-related items by restructuring US Munitions List (USML) Categories IV and XV, adding new controls and decontrolling less sensitive items. The BIS PR would align with DDTC’s proposed changes by amending the Commerce Control List to include spacecraft and related items taken off the USML, resulting in new ECCNs for materials and software: The BIS PR also proposes a new license exception for Commercial Space Activities. 
• BIS FR: Effective October 23, 2024, the BIS FR removes export licensing requirements under the EAR for Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom for certain remote sensing and space-based logistics, assembly, and servicing spacecraft and related technology. 
• BIS IFR: Also effective October 23, 2024, but subject to public comment, the BIS IFR revises ECCNs 9A004 and 9A515 to ease controls on space-related items by shifting control reasons from NS1 and RS1 to NS2 and RS2, respectively, eliminating export licensing requirements to about 40 countries, and introducing numerous new .y paragraphs. 

Read our full write-up of the rules, here.  

VSD Rule

On September 12, 2024, BIS issued a final rule updating the agency’s voluntary disclosure policy, formalizing three policy memoranda that BIS published between June 2022 and January 2024, and updating the BIS Penalty Guidelines.

The most substantial changes include:

• Addition of nondisclosure as an aggravating factor when determining what administrative sanctions will be sought.
• Whether a violation “enabl[es] human rights abuses” will now be considered to determine whether a violation harms regulatory program objectives.
• An expedited process for disclosing minor technical violation.
• The so-called Snitch Mailbox, which allows any party to notify BIS of another company’s violation and then request permission for certain otherwise prohibited activities.

The new rule also updates the BIS’s penalty guidelines as follows:

• Introducing non-monetary penalties (a suspended denial order with certain conditions, such as training and compliance requirements, as appropriate) as a new type of response to resolve non-egregious violations.
• Eliminating prior practice of allowing a respondent to apply a portion of a suspended or deferred penalty toward compliance program enhancements.
• In non-egregious cases initiated by a voluntary disclosure, no longer capping the base penalty amount at a maximum of $125,000, but instead at one-half of the transaction value.
• In a non-egregious case not initiated by a voluntary disclosure, capping the base penalty amount at the full transaction value.

Read our full summary here. 

ICTS

Following a path started under President Trump Part I and followed vigorously by former President Biden, BIS has increasingly flexed its authority to regulate transactions involving Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) connected to China and other countries of concern. ICTS rules trace back to the first Trump Administration, which in May 2019 declared an emergency concerning foreign adversaries’ exploitation of the ICTS supply chain in the United States. As a result, Commerce is empowered to review, impose mitigating measures on, or even prohibit transactions involving certain foreign adversaries (such as China/Chinese companies) that pose an “undue or unacceptable” risk to critical infrastructure, digital economy, national security, or the safety of US persons. BIS has done so through investigations, although the only order resulting from an investigation to date was the Kaspersky order and through regulations. BIS successfully issued regulations on Connected Vehicles under President Biden and began the process of regulating Unmanned Aircraft Systems  through an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued on January 3.

Connected Vehicles

In an effort to address the potential risk of Chinese and Russian interference through US connected vehicles, BIS introduced restrictions via a final rule on connected vehicles that incorporate certain hardware and software with Russian or Chinese ties on January 14, 2024. 

“Connected vehicle” means: “a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, that integrates onboard networked hardware with automotive software systems to communicate via dedicated short-range communication, cellular telecommunications connectivity, satellite communication, or other wireless spectrum connectivity with any other network or device.” 

The rule targets Vehicle Connectivity Systems (VCS), Automated Driving Systems (ADS) and Covered Software:

• VCS: A hardware or software item installed in or on a completed connected vehicle that directly enables the function of transmission, receipt, conversion, or processing of radio frequency communications at a frequency over 450 megahertz. 
• ADS: Hardware and software that, collectively, are capable of performing the entire dynamic driving task for a completed connected vehicle on a sustained basis, regardless of whether it is limited to a specific operational design domain. 
• Connected Vehicle Manufacturer: A US person who manufactures, assembles, or imports for sale connected vehicles into the United States, or who integrates ADS software on a completed connected vehicle in the United States.
• Covered Software: Software-based components, including application, middleware, and system software, in which there is a foreign interest, executed by the primary processing unit or units of an item that directly enables the function of VCS or ADS at the vehicle level. 
• VCS Hardware Importer: A US person who imports VCS hardware to be manufactured, incorporated, or installed into a connected vehicle intended for sale or operation in the United States, or that has already been installed, incorporated, or integrated into a connected vehicle or subassembly intended to be sold as part of a completed connected vehicle in the United States.

Note there are exemptions to all of the definitions above. Most notably, the above restriction only applies to vehicles that weigh less than 10,000 pounds, though BIS intends to cover commercial vehicles in a later rule.

As a result of the rule, VCS hardware importers will be prohibited from knowingly importing into the United States. VCS hardware that is designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a person owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of China or Russia. Additionally, Connected Vehicle Manufacturers will be prohibited from knowingly importing into or selling completed connected vehicles in the United States that incorporate Covered Software from Russia or China. Finally, Russian and Chinese Connected Vehicle Manufacturers will be prohibited in the United States from knowingly selling completed connected vehicles that incorporate VCS hardware or software, regardless of whether it is manufactured; and prohibited from offering commercial services that utilize completed connected vehicles that incorporate ADS.

The restrictions on VCS hardware for imports do not apply until January 1, 2029, or to model years before 2030. Restrictions on connected vehicle manufacturers do not apply to model years before 2027. Legacy software created prior to March 17, 2026, is also excluded. The final rule goes into effect on March 17, 2025.

ICTS Review Process Formalized

On December 6, 2024, BIS issued a final rule, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” formalizing the regulations that govern the ICTS review process.

The new rule is the finalized iteration of the interim final rule that BIS published on January 19, 2021, establishing procedures for Commerce’s ICTS review.

After two years of implementation and receiving comments, BIS now adds new definitions and revises existing definitions in the final rule. Most of the new changes were aimed at clarifying previous definitions, and the consultation and review timeline. Some of the most significant updates are as follows:

• Removes the threshold of one million users in order for an ICTS transaction involving sensitive personal data to be subject to review, because “numerical thresholds do not necessarily correlate with the risks presented[.]”
• Clarifies which areas of technologies are more likely to trigger ICTS by listing out broad sectors under an expanded definition of “Covered ICTS Transaction” at 15 CFR 791.3. Commerce, however, stresses that these examples do not exclude any sectors from possible review, but rather serve to indicate areas of concern. Namely, “ICTS Transactions involving information and communications hardware and software; ICTS integral to data hosting, computing or storage that uses, processes or retains sensitive personal data; connected software applications; ICTS integral to critical infrastructure; and ICTS integral to critical and emerging technologies.”
• Adds Macau as part of the People’s Republic of China to the foreign adversary list.
• Adding clarifications that address a range of procedural issues including: the Secretary of Commerce’s broad discretion in initiating an ICTS review; the requirement that Commerce consult “appropriate agency heads” in the review process; who is considered a “party to the transaction” under ICTS review; and the right of parties to submit written responses to initial determinations that challenge or correct Commerce’s findings.
• Including a list of prohibited activities (ex. Violating or evading the terms of an ICTS review determination) for which civil and criminal penalties are potentially available.

The new rule took effect February 4.

What to Expect in 2025

Continuity in Export Controls

With tariffs taking up most of Donald Trump’s attention to international trade for the time being, there is relatively little information about how the new Administration will approach export controls. What we do know suggests that the Trump Administration will largely continue the Biden Administration’s hardline “high-fence” approach to stopping the flow of sensitive technology to China. Trump’s “America First Trade Policy” memo contains just one paragraph about export controls, but it calls on the Departments of State and Commerce to adopt policies that “maintain, obtain, and enhance our Nation’s technological edge and … identify and eliminate loopholes in existing export controls — especially those that enable the transfer of strategic goods, software, services, and technology to countries to strategic rivals and their proxies.” Trump’s pick for Secretary of Commerce, Howard Lutnick, stated during confirmation hearings that China must “stop using our tools to compete with us and suggested that DeepSeek was developed using stolen US technology. New export controls on more advanced semiconductors are expected in the near future.

That said, we expect the high fence to encompass a far greater field. We expect the Trump Administration to expand controls related on AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, and critical minerals. There may be efforts to close “loopholes” in prior regulations — which unfortunately, may mean more hideously complicated FDPRs. We also think that the Trump Administration will be more willing to impose unilateral export controls, as opposed to trying to align with the export control policies of allied countries.

We also would not be surprised if the Trump Administration decides that subsidiaries of companies on the Entity lists are also Entities, essentially taking the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s 50% rule or similar and expanding it to entity list entities. Finally, we would expect the Trump Administration would rely less on end use and end user controls and more on license requirements. They may also attempt to reduce the discretion of BIS and the reviewing agencies to approve licenses.

ICTS — More of the Same

We think the Trump Administration will expand ICTS regulations and enforcement actions. After all, it was the first Trump Administration that issued the 2019 executive order declaring a national emergency related to ICTS and requiring Commerce to review ICTS transactions.

With ICTS regulation of connected vehicles up and running, we expect that Commerce will next turn its attention to Chinese-made drones. As noted above, on January 2, BIS issued advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, seeking public input on how best to regulate ICTS that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of China and Russia and that are integral to unmanned aircraft systems. Public comments were due by March 4, and you can expect a proposed rule and final rule to follow later this year.

Other potential areas of focus are possibly listed in the ICTS regulations themselves. In particular, 15 CFR § 791.3(a)(4)(vi) gives Commerce the ability to regulate ICTS that is integral to drones (addressed in the January 2025 advanced notice), autonomous systems (partly addressed in the final rule on connected vehicles discussed above), artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum computing, quantum key distribution, and advanced robotics.

AI Regulations in Limbo

While we expect the Trump Administration to continue expanding export controls and ICTS regulations, we are less certain about the fate of certain other Biden-era rules imposing regulatory burdens on US companies that are involved in AI. These rules were authorized (at least in part) by Biden’s October 30, 2023, Executive Order 14110 entitled “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence,” which was among the 78 executive orders that the Trump Administration rescinded on January 20. This leaves at least two regulations in a state of limbo:

• BIS’s January 29, 2024, proposed rule required Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers in the United States to collect information about their foreign customers and report it to the government. This was authorized in part by the Biden AI executive order. The proposed requirements would have applied to providers who know of any “transaction by, for, or on behalf of a foreign person which results or could result in the training of a large AI model with potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity.” Under the proposal, if the information collected gave BIS reasonable grounds to conclude that a foreign government or person is conducting malicious activities using US-provided IaaS, then BIS could require the IaaS provider to prohibit or impose certain conditions on the customer’s account. 
• On September 11, 2024, BIS proposed a rule mandating US companies to submit quarterly reports on specific activities related to advanced AI systems. This proposal, issued pursuant to Biden’s 2023 AI executive order, aimed to enhance oversight of advanced AI systems and computing clusters with potential national security implications by requiring US persons to notify BIS on quarterly basis if they engage in, or plan to engage in:
• • Development of Dual-Use Foundation AI Models: Conducting any AI model training run utilizing over 10^26 computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-point operations).
  • Development, Acquisition, or Possession of Large-Scale Computing Clusters: Involving clusters having a set of machines transitively connected by networking of over 300 Gbit/s and having a theoretical maximum performance greater than 10^20 computational operations (e.g., integer or floating-point operations) per second for AI training, without sparsity. 

Among the purposes of requiring these reports was to gather information for further regulations that restrict countries of concern’s access to dual-use foundation AI models. The proposed rule stated that “the U.S. Government must prepare the defense industrial base for the possibility that foreign adversaries or non-state actors will use dual-use foundation models for activities that threaten the national defense, including to develop weapons and other dangerous technologies. Accordingly, the U.S. Government requires information about the safety and reliability of AI models, including any potentially dangerous capabilities that developers of dual-use foundation models have identified with respect to those models.”

With the revocation of Biden’s 2023 executive order, it would appear that both of these proposed rules lack the authorization to move forward. It is possible, of course, that Trump may issue his own AI executive order thereby putting his own stamp on the issue and authorizing his Administration to take similar or different actions in the AI space.

[1] ‘Parameters’ refers to any value learned during AI model training (e.g., network weights, biases, etc.).

[2] AI models are trained on large data sets and as they are trained, the algorithms adjust numerical parameters, called model weights, that weigh the results of the operations. As the AI model is trained, the model weights are optimized.

[3] Operations are “mathematical operations used for pre-training and any subsequent training, such as fine-tuning the pre-trained model, but does not include the collection and curation of the input training data. Training ‘operations’ should account for operations required to perform all steps in the pre-training and subsequent training process, including those for forward and backward propagation for all relevant layers, pooling, and convolutions, regardless of the implementation and hardware limitations, and applied to all relevant operations.”